Introduction
In the winter of 1973, some major oil exporting countries joined together to declare an embargo on oil exports to some of the western countries for political reasons. Elated by their success and the realization that they controlled a major share of the oil exports, they subsequently raised the price of oil four-fold and cut back production, thereby obtaining, in the face of an almost inelastic demand, increased revenues.
The major oil importing countries have been trying to work out an optimal policy designed to obtain their energy needs at lowest possible prices. One of the strategies considered by these countries is to attempt to split the oil cartel by bilateral dealings or by trying to play one member off against another. This paper analyses the feasibility of such a strate,v and its cost in financial terms using the theory of n-person cooperative games.
In Shenoy,' the world oil market is modelled as a twoperson non-zero-sum game with the oil importing countries denoted by OPIC as one player and the oil exporting countries denoted by OPEC as the second player. In this paper, we divide OPEC into two groups: one led by Saudi Arabia (SA) and the other led by Iran (IR). Despite many common characteristics, each group displays different national attributes and long-term commercial interests. IR, with a larger population, relatively small petroleum reserves, aggressive plans for economic development and military build-up, can use all the revenue available through major price increases. SA on the other hand, has a very small population and hence little capital absorption capability, large petroleum reserves and enormous financial reserves. In a period of rapid inflation, SA would prefer to have the oil in the ground rather than increase production. Also, SA would prefer to keep prices below the substitution threshold for new energy sources because of the fear that a flood of new energy will drive the price downward substantially in advance of the time when SA's petroleum reserves are exhausted. Although huge time lags of seven years or more are involved in energy 0307-904x/80/040301-11/$02.00 0 1980 IPC Business Press substitution, SA fears the impact of potential large scale economies in coal liquefrcation and other related techniques and the possibility of a significant breakthrough in terms of the leaning curve, all of which would help to bring down the future price of energy. IR, facing a much shorter time horizon for the exhaustion of its energy reserves, can push the price of crude oil very high without much fear of the consequences from accelerating new discoveries and the innovation of new sources of energy.2
The models
The world oil market is modelled as a three-person cooperative game in characteristic function form with and without side payments. The characteristic function form of the game is chosen because it focuses on the bargaining process and allocation of payoffs among the players.
Player 1 called OPIC represents all the oil importing countries. Here were assume that all the major oil importing countries have formed a cartel and bargain as one unit. Player 2 called IR and player 3 called SA represent the two groups in the OPEC cartel that have between them all the oil exported to OPIC, who we assume is the sole market for the oil exports.
We shall assume that OPIC needs a total of I million barrels of oil daily (mmbd) assuming consumption required for a maximum growth of their economy. A part of this requirement can be met by domestic production of oil. By a large investment, the domestic production of oil can be increased by finding new sources, or simply working the existing wells harder using improved technology. Alternatively, the demand for oil can partly be satisfied by other fuels such as coal, nuclear fussion, shale oil and other new sources that could be developed by a large investment in research and development. Furthermore, the consumption of oil could be reduced by voluntary or mandatory methods such as rationing the supply of oil, and energy tax, etc. This may, however, resuit in losses in the nation's economy.
In short, the strategy for OPIC is to decide the quantity of oil imports from SA and IR. More formally, the strategy space of OPTC is denoted by:
Associated with a strategy (x2, x3) E C 1 is a monetary cost to OPIC, denoted by fr(x,) where x1 = x2 t xa, for restricting its imports to xr mmbd. fr(xr) does not include the cost of imports. A sketch of a method of computing f,(x,) is as follows.
Let h(y) denote the total cost in million dollars daily (mm$d) to ensure that domestic production of oil is at least y mmbd. Let g(z) denote the loss in mm$d in OPIC's GNP* if the total oil (energy) consumption is restricted to z mmbd. Then we have:
We will assume that fi(xl) is a nonincreasing, positive, realvalued function defined on the strategy space 2, of OPIC. Several studies havebeen made to determine the function Let C2 and C3 denote the production capacities (in million barrels of oil daily) of IR and SA respectively. Let e2 and ea denote the extraction cost in dollars per barrel of oil (S/b) for IR and SA respectively. Also let M2 and Ma denote the capital investment in million dollars daily (mm$d), necessary to achieve a maximum growth rate for IR's and SA's economy. For 0 <y < M2 and 0 < z < Ms, let f,(y) and f3(z) denote the losses in mm$d to IRS and SA's economies if capital investment is restricted toy and z mm$d respectively. Any capital in excess of M2 and M3 is available as capital reserves. We will assume that f2 and f3 are nonincreasing, real-valued functions defined on the real interval [0, -). A sketch of the possible nature of these functions is shown in Before defining the characteristic functions of the side payment and the non-side payment game, we will make the following assumptions regarding the parameters of the problem.
c2<ca<r<c2+c3
Al
lf;(xs)l > 1 for each 0 <x3GM3 A7
Assumptions Al-A7 represent the realities of the situation being modelled.
Side payment model
In this section, we will assume that unrestricted side payments are allowed. We will use the von Neumann-Morgenstern3 model of the characteristic function. This is derived by considering the maximum each coalition can guarantee itself under any circumstances. Also, we assume that utility is linear in money. Let N = fl, 2, 3) denote the set of players; 2N, the set of all subsets of N called coalitions; and V: 2N-t E', the characteristic function which is defined as follows: These assumptions, again, reflect the realities of the situation. So we have the following relation:
O<v ( We shall now determine the relative magnitudes of the values of the characteristic function. We have*:
Clearly, by assumptions A4 and A6, the maximum in the above expression is achieved at x2 = C2, PZ = e2 + @42/G), and so we obtain:
Similarly, we obtain:
where K = min {e2 C, + e,(Z -C,), e& + e2(Z -C's)).
In O-normalized form, the characteristic function is as follows: 
E: v(123)= convKu1(-fiV) -K),u,(-f2(O)),~~(-f~(O))) (ul(-fiV-K-Mz)rU2(-f2(M2)),U3(-f3(0))) @I(-fi(Z) -K -J43), uz(-fi(O)),u3(-f3(M3)))
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Here we assume that:
See Figures 3 and 4 for a geometrical representation of the above game. This completes the formulation of the world oil market as a non-side payment game. In the subsequent sections, we study the solutions of the side payment and the non-side payment game.
Solutions of the side payment game
There are many solution concepts for n-person cooperative games with side payments. Each solution has its own intuitive justification. In this section we will study the core, the Shapley value, the bargaining set, the nucleolus, and the normalized nucleolus. Let us denote the characteristic function defined in the section on the side payment model as follows: Y -a>, (a, O,Y -4) The outcomes in the core have to be interpreted carefully. The core as defined above assumes that IR and SA (players 2 and 3) are acting independently without any collusion. Also we assume that all the oil consumers are be met by a 'counterobjection'.
Several kinds qf bargaining sets were defined. One of these denoted by I@) was shown by PeleglO to be nonempty for each partitioning of the players into a coalition structure.
The bargaining set MB) for our game is given by: The bargaining set corresponding to the grand coalition coincides with the core. The bargaining set also indicates that when OPIC and IR are in a coalition against SA, IR has no bargaining power at all vis-a-vis OPIC. An observation of all the outcomes in the bargaining set reveals that it is in the mutual interest of all the players to form the grand coalition (consisting of all three players).
acting together as one player. (These assumptions are not based on reality but describe a scenario where OPEC splits up into two and the oil consuming countries form a cartel). In this situation, we have a market with one buyer (OPIC) and two sellers (IR and SA). As would be intuitively expected, OPIC is at an advantage since it can play one seller off against another. The outcomes in the core reflect this. Also the core indicates that SA is in a relatively better position compared to IR. This is also to be expected as SA has more oil than IR and also has a lesser need for revenue compared to IR. The core consists of many outcomes and does not distinguish any particular imputation as more likely than others.
Skapley value
The rationale for the Shapley7 value is in terms of the The Shapley value also indicates that OPIC has an advantage over IR and SA and SA has an edge over IR. The Shapley value besides determining a unique allocation of the payoff solely by the characteristic function of the game has a certain equity principle built into it. This solution might therefore be a strong contender for the status of a 'normative' solution, i.e., one which 'rational players' ought to accept. Its weakness is that it derives entirely from the characteristic function of the game and not from what is 'beneath' the characteristic function, i.e., the strategic structure of the game itself rather than the bargaining positions of the players in the process of coalition formation.
Bargaining set M f)
The bargaining set was first introduced by Aumann and Maschlers (A-M). The A-M bargaining set was developed to attack the following general question. If the players in a cooperative n-person game have decided upon a specific coalition structure, how then will they distribute the values of the various coalitions among themselves in such a way that some stability requirements will be satisfied (cf. Davis and Maschler9 (p. 39). These stability requirements are based on the idea that a 'stable' payoff configuration should offer some security in the sense that each 'objection' could
Nucleolus and normalized-nucleolus
The nucleolus, v, was defined by Schmeidler." Let y = (y 1, yz, y3) be an imputation. Then the excess of coalition R with respect to imputation y is:
The excess of coalition R with respect to imputation y is a measure of coalition R's 'complaint' against imputation y .
The nucleolus is that imputation which minimizes the 'loudest complaint'. (In case of a tie in the largest complaint, the next largest excesses are compared etc.) The nucleolus consists of a unique imputation in the bargaining set M,(') and the core if the latter is nonempty.
The normalized-nucleolus (n-nucleolus) p suggested by Lucas and studied by Grotte l2 is defined in the same manner as the nucleolus except that excesses eRb) are replaced by normalized-excesses: The n-nucleolus p for our game is given (in all cases) by: p = ((27 + P + 3a)/6, (7 -P)/3, (27 + P -3~)/6) * For convenience of notation, the partition 111, (2 1, {3) is denoted by (1) (2) (31, etc. t Denotes the set {(y,, 0, P -v,): (I Q yI 4 p:
If we denote v = (vr , v2, v3) and 1_1= (pr , pz, pa) then in all cases we have: vi > va > v2 and /Ji~l-k~ElZ
Solutions of the non-side payment game
In this section, we study the core and the bargaining set of the non-side payment game defined earlier in the paper.
Core
The core of a game without side payments has been studied by Aumann,rs Billerar4,15 and Scarf.16 A vector of utility levels is suggested which is feasible for all the players acting collectively and an arbitrary coalition is examined to see whether it can provide higher utility levels for all of its members. If this is possible, the utility vector which was originally suggested is said to be dominated by the coalition. The core of the n-person game consists of those utility vectors which are feasible for the entire group of players and which can be dominated by no coalition.
For our game, the core C is given as follows: (see Figure 7) . The core again exhibits the advantage of OPIC over SA and IR and the advantage of SA over IR.
Bargaining set
The A-M bargaining set Mf) was generalized by Peleg17 to games without side payments. However, he showed that it may be empty for some games. Billerais proposed another bargaing set Mi') based on the following simple principle. A q ayoff vectdr y is said to belong to the bargaining set err) if whenever player k has a justified objection (i.e., an objection that has no counterobjection) against player I Asscher l9 proved that Mp) is never empty for games without side payments. For our games we have Mf) = SF) and it is given as follows (see As in the side payment case, the bargaining set for the grand coalition coincides with the core as determined in the previous section. Also it is observed that it is in the mutual interest of all the pIayers to form the grand coalition.
